Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Legislation by Melnbrencis, Velta A.
FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY LEGISLATION
In 1966 the first federal legislation was passed affecting newly
manufactured motor vehicles.' This comment will review some
of the reasons for this legislation, its basic provisions, and its
present effectiveness.
I. HISTORY
The first auto accident was reported in 1897.2 Legal writers
were expressing concern over automobile accident consequences
as early as 1919. 3 As the number of motor vehicles in the United
States grew to 91,000, the number of annual accidents increased
steadily. From 1900 to 1964 over 1,500,000 Americans died in
motor vehicle accidents, greatly exceeding the number of combat
deaths in all wars.4 In 1965 alone some 49,000 lost their lives in
such accidents, while some three million were injured, ninety per-
cent of them requiring medical attention, with one in every four
being hospitalized. Direct economic loss totalled 8,500,000,000 dol-
lars.5 Some state or federal action had to be taken to prevent the
prediction of seventy thousand motor vehicle deaths for 19756
from becoming a reality.
While federal regulations have governed various safety as-
pects of air, railway and marine transportation systems, the re-
sponsibility for highway safety, with the exception of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission's regulation of a limited number of
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L No. 89-563,
80 STAT. 718, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1281-1425 (Supp. 1965-66).
- See Hearings on H.R. 13228 Before the House Comm. on Interstate amd Foreign
Commerce, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. [hereinafter referred to as Hearings on H.R. 13228],
pt 1, at 63 (1966).
' E.g., Rollins, A Proposal to Extend the Compensaoin Principle to Accidents in
the Streets, 4 MASS. LQ. 392 (1919).
' From 1900 through 1964 motor vehicles accounted for 1,510,000 deaths, while
wars accounted for 605,000 deaths from 1775 through 1964. See 112 CONG. REC. 1841
(1966).
' Hearings on the Federal Role in Traffic Safety Before the Subcomm. on Execu.
tlive Reorganization of the Senate Comm. on Gov't Operation, 89th Cong, 2d Sess.
[hereinafter referred to as Hearings on the Federal Role in Traffic Safety], pt. 3, at
1105 (1966).
Hearings on H.R. 13228, pt. 1 at 63.
See generally, JOFN GUANDOLO, TRANSPORTATION LAw (1966); FRIIVEucm
ARzT, MARINE LAws, NAVIGATION AND SAFETY (1953).
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trucks,8 has been left to the states. In the past each state has had a
motor vehicle code setting forth specific traffic laws and penalties
for their violation.0 Many states also have laws regarding motor
vehicle equipment, such as brakes, lighting equipment, tires, or
safety glass.1° Yet often these provisions are very general in na-
ture,:" apply out-of-date standards, 12 and may not even be com-
plied with, since more than half of the states have no motor vehicle
inspection laws.' 3 In such states, unless an infraction of equipment
' Under 49 U.S.C. § 302 (1964) the Interstate Commerce Commission has the
duty to regulate common and contract carriers by motor vehicle, and under 49 US.C.
§ 304 (1964) it may also establish reasonable requirements with respect to service
and safety of operation and equipment for private carriers. However, carriers engaged
instrictly intrastate operations are exempted. Currently out of a total of 15 million
trucks only some two million are under the Commissions jurisdiction. See Headring on
H.R. 13228, pt. 1 at 599.
' See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4511.01-.99 (Page 1964), dealing with
traffic control devices, speed regulations, traffic rules, right of way, pedestrians, parking,
etc.
'0 See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4513.01-.99 (Page 1964); CAL. VEHICLE
CODE §§ 24002-27302.
1l See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4513.02 (Page 1964) which simply pro.
hibits highway use for any vehicle which is in such unsafe condition as to endanger
any person. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4513.04 (Page 1964) provides that every motor
vehicle must be equipped with at least two headlights, one near each side of the front
of the motor vehicle. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4513.20 (Page Supp. 1966) (A) re-
quires every motor vehicle to be equipped with brakes "adequate to control the move-
ment of and to stop and hold such . . . motor vehicle," while (B) requires that the
brakes most be maintained in "good working order" and shall be so adjusted as to
operate equally on the wheels on opposite sides of the vehicles. Interpretation of what
is "adequate" or "in good working order" is left to the courts. But tee PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 75 § 816(a) (Supp. 1966) which measures brake performance by a deceleration rate
(rate measured in feet per second at which a vehicle is brought from a speed of 20
miles per hour) and stopping distance (distance within which a vehicle is brought from
a speed of 20 miles per hour to a stop on a hard surface) according to the type of
vehicle involved.
12 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4513.26 (Page 1964) which requires safety
glass in motor vehicles, safety glass being defined as any product composed of glass so
manufactured, fabricated or treated as substantially to prevent shattering and flying of
the glass when it is struck or broken. Yet today's concern is with the development of a
windshield that will keep a person in the vehicle during an accident; much research
has been done on windshields in recent years, and glass in 1966 cars is greatly im-
proved. See Hearings on S. 3005 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. [hereinafter referred to as Hearings on S. 3005], at 238 (1966).
1" See Hearings on H.R. 13228, pr. 1, at 221 (1966) for a listing of states with
vehicle inspection programs.
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standard laws is easily observable, such as a burnt out light or
faulty muffler, it may not be discovered until an accident occurs.
Even though state inspection laws often exempt out-of-state ve-
hicles,1 some reports indicate that nearly fifty percent of examined
vehicles fail to pass the inspection requirements.'5 Most of the
state law enforcement has concentrated on the drivers' observance
of traffic regulations.1 6 Similarly, the courts have dealt with acci-
dent consequences mostly on the basis of the drivers' fault. Only
recently has there been a realization that accidents may be caused
by mechanical defects in the vehicle and that manufacturers should
be held responsible for losses due to defective manufacture, or
possibly even defective design, of motor vehicles or equipment.1t
At the same time, a few state legislatures have taken steps to im-
prove auto safety in their states, either through establishment of
motor vehicle safety research facilities' or revision of laws regu-
lating motor vehicle equipment.' 9
The federal government first took an active interest in traf-
fic accidents in 1924 when the first National Conference on
Street and Highway Safety was called. In 1926, the Confdrence
approved a model for a Uniform Vehicle Code, which though
praised was never adopted by any state. At the request of the
Congress in 1936, the Bureau of Public Roads made a compre-
hensive report regarding traffic safety, indicating inadequacy of sta-
tistics, research and uniformity of laws, and noting the need for
skilled investigation. Again, nothing was done about the accident
problem, though other conferences were called from time to
14 Pennsylvania, for example, provides that if a car is purchased outside and brought
within the state, the owner has up to 48 hours to comply with inspection laws; ob-
viously this would, in effect, create an exemption for most out-of-state travelers. See
PA. STAT. ANN,. tit. 75, § 834 (1960). See also Brenner, Legal Requirements for tk
Equipment and Design of Private Motor Vehides: State Acion and National Problem,
23 GEo. WAsH. L REv. 429 (1955).
' See, e.g., Hearings on 13228, pt 1, at 430 (statement by President of Insurance
Institute for Highway Safety).
See Hearings on H.R. 13228, pt. 2, at 1313-19 (1966).
Philo, Automobile Products Liability Litigation, 4 DUQ. L REv. 181, 182 (1966).
IS See, e.g., N.Y. VEICLE AND TRAFFIc LAW § 216 which established an auto-
motive-medical research division to do medical and engineering research in the field of
motor vehicle safety.
See, e.g., CAL. VEMCLE CODE § 26508 (emergency stopping system); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 95 1/2, § 216 (Supp. Smith-Hurd 1967) (new tire regulations).
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time.20 In 1956 a special subcommittee of the House Interstate
and Foreign Commerce Committee held hearings regarding high-
way safety. The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 directed the
Secretary of Commerce to make a comprehensive investigation of
the entire subject of highway safety. In 1959 a bill was introduced
in the House, H.R. 1341, requiring certain safety standards for
government-purchased automobiles; no action was taken by the
Senate. Basic arguments against the measure were that the indus-
try could voluntarily build in safety features without being re-
quired to do so, that the cost to the government would be pro-
hibitive, and that the government would have too much control
over the design of automobiles. Finally the Eighty-eighth Congress
adopted the Roberts Act21 giving authority to the General Service
Administration to establish passenger vehicle safety standards for
federal government vehicles.22 Subsequently, federal standards were
issued covering certain required safety devices for government-
purchased vehicles, such standards to become effective in Septem-
ber of 1966.23 Laws were also enacted to allow the Secretary of
Commerce to prescribe hydraulic brake fluid2 4 and seat belt speci-
fications.25 Yet over the years Congress has indicated a belief that
states should work out any necessary legislation affecting their own
highways. Thus in 1957 the Beamer resolution20 was passed allow-
ing the states to enter into agreements or compacts for the estab-
lishment of traffic safety programs, including research into safe
automobile and highway design. Unfortunately, because of organi-
zational and financial problems, by 1966 the state compact had
only completed standards for tires. It had yet to consider tire re-
treads and many other automobile or equipment features believed
Apathy and failure of the public and public officials to act positively Is based upon
(a) ignorance of facts, (b) political powers preventing action, and (c) economic fac.
tors which underlie the failure. Unless the public demands action, officials are seldom
moved. See Kelner, Stop Murder by Motor, reprinted in 12 CONG. R1c. 1841, at 1848
(daily ed. Feb. 2, 1966).
40 U.S.C. §§ 701-03 (1964).
For congressional history see Hearings on H.R. 13228, pt. 1, at 64; 22 CONG.
Q. ALMANAC 268 (1966).
See Hearings on H.R. 13228, pt. 1, at 628-67 for G.S.A. standards.
Pub. L. No. 87-637, §§ 1-3, Sept. 5, 1962, 76 STAT. 437, repealed by Pub. L.
No. 89-563, Title I, § 117(a), Sept. 9, 1966, 80 STAT. 727.
Pub. L. No. 88-201, §§ 1-3, Dec. 13, 1963, 77 STAT. 361, repealed by Pub. L,
No. 89-563, Title I, § 117(a), Sept. 9, 1966, 80 STAT. 727.
H.RJ.RnFS. 221, adopted as Pub. L. No. 85-684, 72 STAT. 635 in 1958, repealed
by Pub. L. 89-564, Title I, § 102(a), Sept. 9, 1966, 80 STAT. 734.
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unsafe.27 Obviously, the state compact could not be looked to for
a quick research and comprehensive automobile standards in the
near future. Even if standards were adopted by the state compact,
they would still have to be enacted into law by the various state
legislatures.28
In 1965 the United States Senate began hearings regarding the
federal role in traffic safety.29 It found that governmental efforts had
been small, disorganized and uncoordinated and that there was
lack of data on traffic accidents.30 One emerging idea seemed to be
that traffic safety was dependent on four factors: the driver, the
highway, the law, and the vehicle.3 1 Controversy existed regarding
the importance of each factor. Drivers' error was claimed to be in-
volved in most motor vehicle accidents.3 2 On the other hand, some
argued that an important part of having safe vehicles was proper
maintenance.33 Manufacturers asserted they were safety-conscious
in designing cars and were spending substantial amounts on safe-
ty.34 But many researchers stated that vehicle design errors had
contributed to pedestrian as well as passenger injuries and called
for improvements in many areas.3 5 As to the federal role, opinions
varied. While some advocated active government participation, 8
others, while advocating use of federal funds for research and oth-
er purposes, either stressed the development of state standards
and programs37 or suggested that vehicle development should be
' Before any state could join the compact, it had to pass enabling legislation. Sep-
arate legislation was required for financing. New York was the first state to enter the
compact in 1962; it was joined by 26 states in 1963, six in 1964 and 12 in 1965. The
first organizational meeting was held in 1963. The first annual meeting of the Vehide
Equipment Safety Commission (consisting of representatives from the various states of
the compact) was held in 1964. An office was opened and an executive director ap-
pointed only in 1966. For history of the interstate compact see Headrings on H.R. 13228,
p. 1, at 771.
2' E.g., OFto REV. CODE ANN. § 4513.52 (Page 1964), which provides that no
rule, regulation, or code issued by the vehicle equipment safety commission is to take
effect until approved and set forth in a law passed by act of the general assembly.
See Hearings on the Federal Role in Traffic Safely, parts 1, 2, 3, and 4 (1966).
See id., pt. 3 at 1077.
Id. at pt. 2, 686-74 (statement by President of American Motors).
-2 Id. at 868.
Id. at 870, 979.
Id. at 653-72, 870, 897-908.
Id. at 105079, 934.
"Id. at 1288-98 (statement by Ralph Nader).
Id. at 1109-11 (statement by National Safety Council).
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left to the industry.38
On March 2, 1966, President Johnson delivered to the Con-
gress his Message on Transportation. He urged the establishment
of a Department of Transportation to consolidate all federal
agencies dealing with transportation promotion and safety, and
the adoption of a highway safety program providing for increased
federal grants to states for highway safety, improved automobile
safety performance and federal highway safety research.80 Subse-
quently, various bills were introduced into the House and Senate
dealing with automobile safety, and many hearings were held. The
major House bill, H.R. 13228, initially provided that the Secre-
tary of Commerce should have discretion to issue safety standards
if after two years he determined that existing standards were inade-
quate.40 Opponents argued that inasmuch as the private industry
had never issued and followed any voluntary standards in the past,
further delay would simply put more millions of defectively de-
signed cars or cars lacking requisite safety features on the road. 41
Finally, even the automobile industry suggested immediate man-
datory federal standards. 42 The Senate bill, S. 3005, which be-
came the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966,
calls for mandatory standard-setting by the Secretary of Com-
merce43 not only for passenger automobiles but for all motor ve-
hicles.44
During the hearings on the bills many previously raised argu-
ments were again heard. Undoubtedly the industry could volun-
tarily design and build safer motor vehicles and equipment. But
in the past it had occasionally failed to do so, even when it was
aware of potentially dangerous design features or had plans avail-
able for safer equipment. 45 Some safety features became part of
the standard equipment on all vehicles after the General Service
I d. at 914 (statement by Ford Motor Co.).
• See Hearings on S. 3005, at 2-12.
, See Hearings on H.R. 13228, at 3.
Id. at 555 (statement by Sen. Abraham Ribicoff).
42 Id. at 273.
'3 15 U.S.C. § 1392 (1964).
41 15 U.S.C. § 1391 (1964).
" Since some of the existing research on vehicle safety had been industry.sponsorcd
the results were available to the industry. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R, 13228, 693-714
(statement by President of Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory and exhibits regarding past




Administration requested such features for government vehicles.40
The industry claimed that other devices were impossible to pro-
duce, yet they became available when legislation required them.4
Thus the industry is seemingly capable of solving many prob-
lems once it decides to do so. Why has the industry been so hesi-
tant? One of its arguments is that today's cars are safe.4s Undoubt-
edly motor vehicles are safer today than thirty years ago.49 But there
is ample evidence that certain recent design features, such as fins
or sharp ornaments on the outside of the vehicle, have proved
dangerous to pedestrians. 50 Similarly, door locks and door hinges
have been inadequate, resulting in passengers being thrown out
of the vehicle during accidents, thus aggravating their injuries.51
There is also no doubt that protruding instrument knobs have
been fatal 2 and that safety glass has been safe only at low speeds. 3
As to past industry arguments that the public does not want
safety,54 they could only be applicable in regard to optional equip-
ment. There have never been any statistics to show how many
people would or would not have purchased optional safety features
if they had been fully informed of their value. 5 Furthermore, it is
questionable whether such a choice can properly be left to the in-
dividual when the presence or absence of some safety feature may
1966 automobiles sold by the "big four" included as standard equipment all but
two of the 17 items which had been required by GS.A. specifications on 1967 model
cars purchased by the government. See 112 CONG. REc 20600 (daily ed. Aug. 31, 1966).
' After California passed its Vehicle Code § 27156 requiring certified motor ye-
hide pollution control devices, the industry was able to produce such devices by the ef-
fective date of the statute. Also, in November of 1965 the industry stated that collapsible
steering wheels could not be produced in the foreseeable future; yet three months later
General Motors announced that such steering wheels would be standard equipment on
1967 models, See Hearings on S. 3005, at 195-201.
" See Hearings on S. 3005, at 463, 551.
' See Hearings on Federal Role in Traffic Safety, pt. 2, 819-20 for the many safety
features incorporated into vehicles by Chrysler over the years.
I' d. Pt. 2, 1050-75.
Id. at 683-723 (Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory Reports).
"See Hearings on S. 3005, at 574.
5Id. at 238.
, In 1955, Ford Motor Co. stressed safety in its advertising campaign for 1956
model cars. See Hearings on S. 3005 at 894. When in 1956 Ford's sales dropped sharply,
many apparently blamed this on the safety approach. See O'Connell, Taming the Audo-
mobile, 58 Nw. U.L. REV. 299, 363 (1963).
' For example, it has taken many years to make drivers understand the value of
seat belts. Yet the National Safety Council estimated that in 1958 5,000 lives could
be saved by the use of seat belts. See Hearings on S. 3005, at 140.
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affect not only the safety of the purchaser himself but also that of
his passengers and others on the road 50 Even some manufacturers
suggest "force-feeding" with safety features.57 As to the design
and manufacture of the car itself, obviously the manufacturers
are in a better position to judge safety requirements than the
average man.58 Thus there may be truth in the accusation that
in the past manufacturers have been more concerned with style
because they have felt that style sells cars.50 Inasmuch as the auto-
motive industry is vital to the national economy, with millions of
our population directly connected with it, the importance of the
industry's continued ability to sell more and more vehicles cannot
be underestimated. Yet the so-called public demand for style
changes is probably industry-created through its advertising, 0 and
arguably the same results could be achieved by channelling some
of the funds spent on styling into safety research and by incorpor-
ating more safety features in the design. At the same time the acci-
dent problem could probably be alleviated by less stress on high-
speed, high-powered cars. Since excess speed is thought to be one
reason for driver-caused accidents, it may be the responsibility of
the industry to establish the maximum speed and power necessary
for today's roads and safe driving and to gear manufacture accord-
ingly.01 In the past, competition among automobile manufacturers
has been very keen. So long as some companies devoted a large
part of their budget and advertising efforts to styling, others did
not want to be in a less competitive position by stressing safety at
the expense of styling, especially since past safety promotion was
unsuccessful. Now that the government requires companies to
comply with certain safety standards, they will probably spend
more funds on safety research and design, but less on styling, and
thus remain in the same competitive position. Any voluntary agree-
ment among the competitors to decrease their styling budget would
See Hearings on Federal Role in Traffic Safety, pt. 2 at 657-78 (General Motors'
statement that public acceptance of safety devices is necessary; also industry's retreait
from the idea that "safety does not sell").
Id. at 871 (American Motors' President's suggestion that the purchaser should be
required to delete the safety equipment which he does not desire).
Id. at 677-78.
0 See O'Connell, supra note 54, at 375. See generally R. NADEm, UNSAFE AT ANY,
SPEED (1966); J. O'CONNELL & A. MYERS, SAFETY LASr (1966).
* Note, Automobile Safety: A diagnosis of An Epidemic, 23 WAsi. L. Rnv. 327,
336 (1967).
" See Hearings on Federal Role in Traffic Safety, Pt. 2, 906; Hearings on H,R.
13228, pt. 1, 320; Hearings on S. 3005, 421, 452-54.
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probably have been subject to antitrust laws, though joint re-
search facilities for developing safety standards would have been
legal.62 Certainly, through the proposed federal program additional
funds will be available for research, thus benefiting both the manu-
facturers and the public.65
While there have been a few suggestions that the cost for re-
search should come out of the manufacturers' profits,64 most leg-
islators probably assumed the costs would be transmitted to the
buying public in the nature of increased motor vehicle costs.65
No accurate estimates of the increased costs due to incorporation
of safety features were available. It was believed the manufacturers
would try to keep prices down, partly through elimination of fea-
tures which serve no useful purpose and partly through mass econ-
omies by making some formerly optional equipment standard on
all vehicles. Some features would probably involve no extra cost,
since they would be incorporated as a part of the general design
of the vehicle.68
As to the federal government's intervention in the automo-
bile industry, federal standards were not intended to cover every
' See letter from the Antitrust Division indicating that joint efforts, not accom-
panied by unduly restrictive collateral agreements, to forward the use of safety devices
or exchange information concerning standards of safety would not be prohibited by
antitrust laws, Hearings on S. 3005 at 542. A different situation would be presented,
however, if the industry tried to enforce incorporation of the advances made in coopera-
tive research in testing. Yet without enforcement possibilities there would never be any
assurance to the public that the voluntary agreement would continue for long and
would not be just a technique for avoiding federal legislation. The cigarette industry
with its advertising code is an example of a voluntary agreement4 which some mem-
bers later repudiated, thus rendering it ineffective. See Levin, The Limits of Self-Reg-
Jation, 67 COLUM. L REv. 603 (1967); Boyd and Claycamp, Industrial Self-Regldetion
and the Public Interej, 64 MCH. L. REV. 1239, 1245-52 (1966). It must also be
remembered that the "big four" do not constitute the entire automotive industry. Even
disregarding truck, bicycle and motorcycle manufacturers, there are many manufacturers
who either produce equipment and parts for the initial manufacture of motor vehicles
or for replacement and would be affected by any federal motor vehicle or equipment
safety standards. Thus, for example, the Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association
alone consists of some 580 independent manufacturers of parts and equipment for the
automobile industry; the Automotive Service Industry Association represents 1,000 auto-
motive parts manufacturers, warehouse distributors and parts rebuilders, along with
5000 major wholesale firms. See Hearings on H.R. 13228, pt. 2 at 944, 1217.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1409 (1964) for authorized appropriation.
,See Hearings on Federal Role in Traffic Safety, pt. 3 at 1238 (statement of Sen.
Robert F. Kennedy).
" See Hearings on S. 3005 at 36-40.
"Id. at 48, 49, 54, 88.
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component and function of a motor vehicle but only those vehicle
characteristics that have a significant bearing on safety. 7 The
manufacturers' job would continue to be to design and manufac
ture the particular feature or equipment.
The Senate Committee on Commerce aptly summarized some
of the reasons for federal legislation: the federal government had
the primary responsibility for regulating the national automotive
manufacturing industry; since the promotion of voluntary stand-
ards had failed, mandatory standards were the only course; and
the federal government should develop individual facilities for
comprehensive basic research of accident and injury prevention,
adequate testing of safety performance and forming of meaning-
ful standards, at the same time retaining vigorous competition
among manufacturers. The Committee also found that the average
man was incapable of evaluating safety of competing model cars.
Thus both the industry and government should supply him with
adequate information. Since in the past industry had been de-
ficient in notifying and curing manufacturing defects, notification
had to be made mandatory. 68 The House Committee conducting
hearings on H.R. 13228 arrived at similar conclusions.0 9 However,
since the House and Senate each preferred its own draft to the
proposed legislation, joint conferences were held in order to ad-
just the differences. Finally, an amended version of S. 3005, en-
titled the "National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966,"
covering all motor vehicles, including all trucks and buses, was
approved by Congress70 and became law on September 9, 1966.
The purpose of this Act is "to reduce traffic accidents and deaths
and injuries to persons resulting from traffic accidents" and there-
fore "to establish motor vehicle safety standards for motor ve,
S. REP. No. 1301, COMM. ON COMMERCE, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1966).
" Id. at 2-8. It is interesting to note that other industries are becoming aware of
the need for continuous improvement. Thus it was recently voiced in the insurance field
that unless the insurance industry solves regulatory problems itself, the result will be
federal legislation; that since the federal government was not interested in trying to
manufacture automobiles, the auto manufacturers lost their freedom but kept their
franchise. Inasmuch as the federal government is very interested in dispensing benefits
to injured people, if the insurance industry fails to sustain the burden of proof that It
measures up to potential and social standards of the government it will lose both Its
freedom and franchise as automobile insurers. See Kemper, The Federal Signpoitvt
Danger Ahead, 1967 INs. L. J. 261, 271; Rose, State Regulation of Property and
Casualty Insurance Rates, 28 OHIO ST. L. J. 669 (1967).
0 See 112 CONG. REC. 18778 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1966).
,0 See 112 CONG. REc. 20595 (daily ed. Aug. 31. 1966).
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hides and equipment in interstate commerce; to undertake and
support necessary safety research and development; and to expand
the national driver register."7'
II. BAsIC PROVISIONS
Under the Safety Act the Secretary of Commerce7 - must issue,
on or before January 31, 1967, federal motor vehicle safety stand-
ards based on existing safety standards and new and revised stand-
ards on or before January 31, 1968.78 Any state motor vehicle
safety standard which relates to the same aspect of the vehicle as
the federal standards must be identical, but the federal govern-
ment or the government of any state or political subdivision may
establish higher performance standards for vehicles or equipment
procured for its own use.7 4 The Interstate Commerce Commission
may impose higher performance standards for special purpose
trucks, if such standards can be complied with subsequent to man-
ufacture of the vehicles.7 5 After consultation with the National
Motor Vehicle Safety Advisory Council,7 6 the Vehicle Equipment
Safety Commission,7 7 and such other state and interstate agencies as
he deems appropriate,78 the standards issued by the Secretary must
be reasonable, practicable, and appropriate for the particular type of
motor vehicle or equipment involved,70 and may be revoked or
15 US.C. §§ 1381-1425 (Supp. 11 1965-66). While some have caimed this
legislation resulted from "extremists' campaigns and the sensationalism that resulted from
the writing of a book" (probably referring to 1L NADER UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED) 112
CONG. REc. 18783 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1966), this is probably an exaggeration. Un-
doubtedly the various publications had resulted in a growing public concern for traffc
safety; yet this might not have been suffitient to pass the Act were it not for the active
support of many legislators who had been involved in traffic safety work in their own
states and the various government agencies.
" Subsequently all the powers vested in the Secretary of Commerce under this act
were transferred to the Secrtary of Transportation. 49 U.S.C. § 1655(1) (1964).
15 U.S.C. § 1392(h) (1964).
75 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1964). It was intended that the various governments
should continue to play a role in the development of standards.
15 US.C. § 1392(g) (1964).
The Secretary must establish this Coundil under 15 U.S.C. § 1393 (1964). Its
majority must represent the general public including state and local government repre-
sentatives; the remainder must include representatives of motor vehicle manufacturers,
motor vehicle equipment manufacturers and motor vehicle dealers. This would allow
independent manufacturers of equipment parts to be represented.
15 U.S.C. § 1392(f) (2) (1964).
'Id.
I d. § 1392 (a), (f) (3) (1964).
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amended. 0 Orders affecting safety standards must specify the effec-
tive date, which normally must be not less than 180 days or more
than one year after issue of such orders."'
For a judicial review, any person adversely affected82 by the
orders of the Secretary may ' appeal within sixty days after the is-
suance of an order to the United States court of appeals for the
circuit wherein such person resides or has his principal place of
business.88 - The judgment of the court affirming or setting aside
any order of the Secretary is final, subject only to review by the
Supreme Court of the United States.84 A certified copy of the
transcript of the record and proceedings is admissible in any proi
ceedings arising under the Act.85
The Secretary must conduct research, testing, development,
and training necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act.80 He
may do this through grants to states, interstate agencies, and non-
profit institutions.8 7 The results of federally-sponsored research
programs are to be available to the public.8 The Secretary may
cooperate with other agencies in developing standards and methods
for inspecting and testing compliance.8 9
The Act specifically prohibits the manufacture for sale, sale,
offer for sale, importation, or introduction in interstate commerce
of any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment manu-
factured on or after the effective date of any applicable federal
motor vehicle safety standard, unless such standard has been com-
plied with.90 However, the Act does not apply once the vehicle
or equipment has been sold to the public0 ' and exempts articles
destined for export and appropriately tagged. 92 Also exempt from
the Act is any person who establishes that he did not know or
have reason to know in the exercise of due care that the vehicle
'o Id. § 1392 (e) (1964).
Id. § 1392(c) and (e) (1964).
Intent was to make this section applicable not only to manufacturers or dealers
but also to automobile owners. 112 CONG. REc. 18795 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1966).
15 U.S.C. § 1394(a) (1) (1964).
s Id. § 1394(a) (4) (1964).
Id. § 1394(b) (1964).
Id. § 1395(a) (1964).
Id. § 1395(b) (1964).
' Id. § 1395(c) (1964).
Id. § 1396 (1964).
Id. § 1397(a) (1) (1964).
Id. § 1397(b) (1) (1964).
Id. § 1397(b) (5) (1964).
[Vol. 29
COMMENTS
or equipment fails to comply with applicable federal safety stand-
ards or holds a certificate of conformance issued by the manufac-
turer or importer, unless he knows of nonconformance. 98 In ad-
dition, temporary imports are exempted and permanent imports
may be permitted when the Secretary of Treasury and Secretary
of Commerce (now Secretary of Transportation) are satisfied that
the vehicle or equipment will be made to conform to the appro-
priate federal safety standards.94
The law also provides for inspection and investigation neces-
sary to enforce the federal vehicle safety standards. 5 Upon pre-
senting proper credentials, the Secretary of Commerce or his agent
may enter any factory or other place in which motor vehicles or
equipment are manufactured. 98 Manufacturers must provide the
Secretary with data related to performance and safety.97 The Sec-
retary is required to keep any trade secrets confidential, 98 unless
disclosure to other government employees is necessary to enforce
the Act.99
Within a reasonable time after discovery of a safety-related
defect, the manufacturer must notify by certified mail the first
purchaser of the vehicle or equipment, or dealer to whom deliv-
ery was made, clearly describing such defect, evaluating the safety
risk, and informing of the measures to be taken to repair such
defect. 00
Every manufacturer must also notify the Secretary of any
communication to purchasers and dealers regarding any defect.1°I
Id. § 1397(b) (2) (1964).
Id. § 1397(b) (3) (1964).
ld. § 1401(a) (1964).
"Id. § 1401(b) (1964). Cases have long upheld the investigative powers of ad-
ministrative agencies as well as their orders for production of documents. See, e.g.,
United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944); United States v.
Louisville & N.R.., 236 U.S. 318 (1915). But there are limitations. See United
States v. International Nickel Co, 203 F. Supp. 739 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), which held
the government cannot be present when the company is determining which documents
m firnish. The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 374 (1964), at-
tempted to be more specific by stating that inspection shall not extend to financial data,
sales data other than shipment data, pricing data, personnel data and research data.
The Safety Act could similarly have been made more specific to avoid future litigation.
" 15 U.S.C. § 1401(d) (1964).
SId. § 1401(e) (1964).
" Id. §§ 1401(e), 1402(d) (1964).
" Id. § 1402(a), (b) and (c) (1964). In case of a sale, a subsequent purchaser
to whom a warranty has been transferred must be notified.
Id. § 1402(d) (1964).
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If the Secretary determines through testing, inspection, investiga-
tion, research, or examination of reports that any vehicle or equip.
ment does not comply with applicable federal motor vehicle safety
standards or contains a safety-related defect, he must immediately
notify the manufacturer of his findings and give him an oppor-
tunity to refute. If the latter fails to establish compliance or lack
of defect, the Secretary must order him to notify the purchaser
and the dealer.10 2
Every manufacturer or distributor of a motor vehicle or
equipment must at the time of delivery furnish to the distributor
or dealer a certification that such vehicle or equipment conforms
to all applicable federal safety standards. Motor vehicles must
show such certification in the form of a permanent label or tag.108
Failure to comply with the safety standards, failure to make
reports, refusal to allow inspection, failure to issue the certificate,
issuance of a false certificate, or failure to notify of defects 0 4 is
subject to a civil penalty, not to exceed 1,000 dollars for each
prohibited act, with a maximum penalty of 400,000 dollars for
any related series of violations, which the Secretary is authorized
to compromise. 105
The United States district courts have jurisdiction to enjoin
violations of safety standards and restrain sale or introduction into
interstate commerce or importation of noncomplying vehicles or
equipment. The Secretary must give the defendant an opportun-
ity to present his views and achieve compliance, except in case of
a knowing and willful violation. 100 Criminal contempt proceed-
ings may be brought for violation of an injunction or restraining
order. 107 Actions for civil penalty as well as injunctions may be
brought in the district where the violation occurred or where the
defendant is found, is an inhabitant, or transacts business; pro.
cess may be served in any district where the defendant is an in-
habitant or may be found.' 08 Subpoenas for witnesses may run
into other districts. 0 9 Importers must designate an agent for serv-
ice of process; in default of such designation, service of process may
102 Id. § 1402(c) (1964).
103 Id. § 1403 (1964).
Id. § 1397(a) (1964).
Id. § 1398 (1964).
' Id. § 1399(a) (1964).
0d7 Id. § 1399(b) (1964).




be made by posting such process, notice, order, etc., in the office
of the Secretary." °0
The Secretary is also required to make an annual report to
the Congress regarding the administration of the Act. The report
must include accident and injury statistics, a list of federal stand-
ards, the degree of observance of the standards, a summary of cur-
rent research grants and contracts, a review of research activities
completed and technological progress achieved during the year,
and the extent of which information was disseminated."'
Within one year after enactment of this Act, the Secretary
must study the adequacy of motor vehicle safety standards and in-
spection requirements and procedures applicable to used motor
vehicles in the various states and make recommendations for neces-
sary additional legislation in his annual report. He must estab-
lish uniform federal motor vehicle safety standards for all used
motor vehicles within one year after the report.112
Title II of the Act deals with tire safety.113 As part of pneu-
matic tire standards, the Secretary must require the tires be spe-
cifically labeled to identify the manufacturer or retreader; show the
composition of the material used, actual number of plies, and the
maximum permissible load; and recite that the tire conforms to
federal minimum safe performance standards. 114 In addition, each
motor vehicle must be equipped by the manufacturer or first pur-
chaser with tires that meet the maximum permissible load stand-
ards."15 The Secretary is also ordered to prescribe a uniform qual-
ity grading system for motor vehicle tires.110 No regrooved tires
may be sold unless permitted by the Secretary.117
Title III:" of the Act deals with accident and injury re-
search. The Secretary is authorized to make a complete investi-
g'ation of the need for research, development, and testing facilities
regarding traffic safety and relating to safety of machinery used
on highways or in connection with their maintenance, and must
' Id. § 1399(e) (1964).
Id. § 1408 (1964).
Id. § 1397(b) (1) (1964).
' Id. §§ 1421-26 (1964).
Id. § 1421 (1964).
'' Id. § 1422 (1964).
'" Id. § 1423 (1964).
"7 Id. § 1424 (1964).
Pub. 1. No. 89-563, §§ 301-303, Sept. 9, 1966, 80 STAT. 729.
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report to Congress by December 31, 1967.110
Title IV of the Act is an amendment of a former Act'20 pro-
viding for a register of drivers with revoked motor vehicle oper-
ator's license. In the future the states must report licenses which
have been denied, terminated, or temporarily withdrawn for pe-
riods longer than six months.' 21
III. ORGANIZATION
Following the enactment of the new law, the Secretary of
Commerce delegated authority to perform the functions under the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act to the Under Sec-
retary of Commerce for Transportation. The latter established
the National Traffic Safety Agency, which was headed by a Traf-
fic Safety Administrator appointed by the President. 122
On October 15, 1966, the Department of Transportation Act
was adopted creating the Department of Transportation to be
headed by the Secretary of Transportation, who was to be ap-
pointed by the President. 23 All functions, powers and duties of
the Secretary and others in the Department of Commerce under
various laws relating to transportation, including the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, were transferred to
the new department. 2 4 Established within this new department
was a Federal Highway Administration, a Federal Railroad Ad-
ministration and a Federal Aviation Administration, each headed
by an Administrator. 25 Most of the functions, powers, and duties
vested in the Secretary of Transportation relating to highway safe-
ty were delegated to the Federal Highway Administrator.' " A
Bureau of Public Roads, a National Highway Safety Bureau and
a National Traffic Bureau, each headed by a Director reporting to
the Federal Highway Administrator, were established within the
Federal Highway Administration. 27 The National Highway Safety
Pub. L. No. 89-563, § 302, Sept. 9, 1966, 80 STAT. 729.
Pub. L. No. 86-660, §§ 1-3, July 14, 1960, 74 STAT. 526, as amended by Pub.
L. 87-359, Oct. 4, 1961, 75 STAT. 779.
" Pub. L. No. 89-563, § 401, Sept. 9, 1966, 80 STAT. 718.
' See 31 Fed. Reg. 15101 (1966).
12 Pub. L. No. 89-670, 80 STAT. 931, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1651-59 (1964).
49 U.S.C. § 1655(1) (1964).
49 U.S.C. § 1652(e) (1) (1964). All other provisions of the Safety Act re-
mained applicable. 49 U.S.C. § 1652(f) (1) (1964).




Agency 1 and the National Traffic Safety Agency were consoli-
dated into the new National Highway Safety Bureau.
IV. EFFECTrVENESS OF THE ACT IN TERMS OF STANDARD-MAKING
While the constitutionality of the Act has not yet been tested
in courts, it will probably be upheld. Long ago, in a case involving
state legislation of vehicles, the Supreme Court implied that fed-
eral control of motor vehicles for the purpose of safety was proper;
only the absence of national legislation enabled the states to exer-
cise such activity. 29 In addition, the power of Congress under
Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the United States Constitution "To
regulate Commerce . . . among the several states" and under
clause 18 "To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers . . ." has been
interpreted broadly in the past, even to reach such activities as
discrimination in motels3 0 or restaurants.' 3 ' As recently reiter-
ated,132 the activities that are beyond the reach of Congress are
"those which are completely within a particular state, which do
not affect other states, and with which it is not necessary to inter-
fere for the purpose of executing some of the general powers of
the government."' 33 No strong argument can be made that the
manufacture or sale of motor vehicles or equipment is a strictly
local activity.
While the Act itself does not specify any standards but orders
the Secretary of Commerce (or Secretary of Transportation, as
now amended) to establish them, safety regulations made pursuant
to constitutional statutory authority have in the past been held to
' The Safety Act had a companion bill, the Highway Safety Act of 1966, 23
U.S.C. §§ 401-04, (Supp. II 1965-66), enacted "to provide for a coordinated national
highway safety program through financial assistance to the states to accelerate highway
traffic safety programs." Under this Act the Secretary of Commerce had to develop uni-
form standards to improve pedestrian and driver performance (including education,
testing, physical and mental examination, and licensing) and to provide for an effective
system of accident investigating and recording, vehicle registration, operation and in-
spection, highway design and maintenance, vehicle codes and laws, emergency services,
etc. While the Act provided for federal appropriations, the programs were to be state-
administered. 23 U.S.C. § 402 (1964). As originally enacted, the Secretary had to
carry out the provisions of the Act through a National Highway Safety Agency. Pub. L
89-509, 80 Star. 735, § 201.
See Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 622 (1915).
See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
"' See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
3' Id. at 302.
' Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824).
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have the same force as though prescribed by the statute,18 4 unless
the statutory authority is exceeded.' 85 While the Secretary's author-
ity to set standards thus seems to be clear, there may be litigation
as to whether particular standards set by the Secretary are valid
in light of the very general language used in describing the stand-
ards:
The Secretary shall establish by order appropriate Federal
motor vehicle safety standards. Each such . .. standard shall
be practicable, shall meet the need for motor vehicle safety,
and shall be stated in objective terms.180
The definition of standards is equally general:
'Motor vehicle safety standards' means a minimum standard for
motor vehicle performance, or motor vehicle equipment per-
formance, which is practicable, which meets the need for motor
vehicle safety and which provides objective criteria.'8 7
This generality was deliberate to allow for a continuous updating
of the standards. Congress could have detailed the standards, but
this would have required it to spend much time initially and each
year thereafter in considering improved standards and taking
appropriate legislative action. Certainly, legislation expressed in
equally general and vague terms has been sustained by courts in
the past.138
But interpretation problems may arise. For example, what is
meant by "appropriate"? The intent was to allow the Secretary to
consider the variety of vehicles on the road and to set basic mini-
mum standards for all vehicles without eliminating some vehicles,
such as sports cars and convertibles, for whom some standards
might be impossible to design and apply. There would be differ-
ences in standards based on the type of vehicle involved. 80 Also,
... New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Novick Transfer Co., 274 F.2d 916, 919 (4th
Cir. 1960).
" See Fleming, Statutory Standards and Negligence in Accident Cass, 11 LA, L.
REV. 95, 96-98 (1950) for challenges to statutes.
us 15 U.S.C. § 1392(a) (1964).
, Id. § 1391(2) (1964).
'' See, e.g., Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964), with its reference to "restraint
of trade," which at first was held to condemn "every" restraint without exception, United
States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 116 U.S. 290 (1897), then interpreted to allow
restraints la,%'ful at common law, United States v. Joint Traffic Assn., 171 U.S. 505
(1898), and finally construed to require the application of the "Rule of Reason," Stand-
ard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
... See 112 CONG. REc. 18794 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1966).
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what is a "practicable" standard? Industry representatives sug-
gested that the text of the Act should be so written as to make it
clear that the Secretary in setting standards should not think in
terms of whether they are "adequate" or "reasonable" but whether
they are worth the cost required to put them into effect.'1 0 These
spokesmen contend there should be several determinations: (1)
cost versus benefit; (2) practicality, i.e., whether in light of exist-
ing engineering and manufacturing knowledge devices can be de-
signed and produced to meet the standards; and (3) available
time, since compliance within six months with any new safety per-
formance standard for any vehicle characteristic not already de-
veloped and planned for production is generally impossible.14 '
Legislators apparently felt that the general words of the statute
would allow the Secretary to analyze all pertinent data. Similarly,
a question can be raised as to when does a standard "meet the need
for motor vehicle safety."' 42
Some of these questions may already have been informally
raised. This appears from an examination of the standard-making
process during the past year. Initially twenty-three standards were
proposed on November 30, 1966, to become effective September
1, 1967. These standards generally applied only to passenger cars
and were of three types: (1) standards designed to reduce the
likelihood that crash will take place; (2) standards designed for
occupant protection in interior impact; and (3) standards designed
to reduce post-crash dangers.' 43 When the industry reacted by
See Hearings on H.R. 13228, pt. 1 at 300.
"' Id. at 300.
" Definition of standards could have been clarified somewhat by adding that it
should include (1) publication of the technical reasoning employed for its promulga-
tion, which would disclose the evidential process leading to the accepted safety level,
and (2) a statement of the conditions of usage for which it is designed to be effective,
for easier understanding of the standards. See Hearings on S. 3005 at 276-77.
" Standards designed to reduce the likelihood that a crash will take place covered
such items as central location and identification of controls, transmission shift level
sequence, starter interlock and transmission braking effort, windshield defrosting and
defogging, windshield wiping and winding systems, hydraulic service brake and parking
brake systems, hydraulic brake hoses, reflecting surfaces, lamps, reflecting devices, new
pneumatic tires, tire selection and rims, and rear view mirrors. Standards designed for
occupant protection covered head restraints, impact protection for driver from steering
control system, steering control rearward displacement, glazing materials to reduce
superficial and deep lacerations from being thrown through windows, door latches and
supports, anchorage of seats, seat belt installation and assemblies, seat belt anchorages,
wheel nuts, wheel discs and hub cabs. Standards designed to reduce post-crash dangers
dealt with fuel tanks, fuel tank pipes and connections. See 31 Fed. Reg. 15212 (1966).
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stating that only ten standards could be met by the effective date
and that other sandards required extensive design change,144 it
may have been questioning the practicality of the standards in
terms of available time. When the manufacturers called the sub-
sequently revised standards illegal,146 they may, in fact, have been
questioning whether the standards were practicable in light of
the available time, existing engineering and manufacturing knowl-
edge, and cost involved. Withdrawal of some standards by the Sec-
retary may indicate he was not certain, upon reconsideration, that
the particular standards met the need for motor vehicle safety.140
Whether 1968 standards will actually make driving safer is
debatable. Many contrary opinions have been heard. Industry re-
quests for modification indicate it felt major changes were in-
volved. Some experts, on the other hand, have resigned in protest
over "weakening" of standards. 47 Yet the first step has been made,
and hopefully satisfactory procedures for drafting, proposing and
adopting standards have now been worked out. At the same time
it must be remembered the standards adopted to date have been
based on existing standards. 148 In the future, the first step may be
research and testing. If the legislators' interest in motor vehicle
safety is sustained, so that sufficient funds are allocated for safety
purposes,1 49 perhaps the optimistic predictions that by 1970 there
.. Standards which could not be met dealt with reflecting surfaces, tires, lighting,
interior protection, and seat and seat belt anchorage. The government then proposed 20
revised standards, with standards for pneumatic tires, tire selection and rims, and In-
stallation of head restraints being temporarily withdrawn. See 32 Fed. Reg. 11776
(1967).
"' Ford and American Motors, respectively. See CONG. Q. WB1KLY REPORT,
Jan. 13, 1967, at 73.
'" For example, requirement for shoulder harnesses was withdrawn pending the
Safety Administrator's discussions with European automotive safety experts. See 32
Fed. Reg. 10072-3, 11776-7 (1967) for other revisions in initial standards.
"' E.g., William I. Stiegiitz, see CONG. &. WEnKLY RE'ORT, Feb. 10, 1967, at
203. But see U. S. Nnws & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 16, 1967, at 66 for the National
Safety Director's statement that preliminary research shows such safety features as better
laminated windshields and energy-absorbing steering assemblies can reduce chances of
death or serious injury by 70 to 80 percent in a crash.
1, Many of the initial standards were adopted from existing GSA or Society of
Automotive Engineers' standards. See Hewitt, National Safety Head Addrerey Auto In-
dustry, POLICE, March-April 1967, at 36, 39.
,' Note that due to budgetary difficulties, the Interstate Commerce Commission
has never been able to inspect more than 40,000 trucks a year. See Hearings on H.R.
13228, pr. 2, at 1052. Note also that the House Appropriations Committee for the year
beginning July 1, 1967, voted to brake the federal auto-safety program by denying $10
million of the $31 million requested. See Wall Street Journal, July 14, 1967, at 3, col. 2.
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may be safety equipment in motor vehicles making it almost im-
possible to kill anyone in an accident at a speed of forty-five miles
per hour will prove true.150
The experience of past years reveals, however, that even though
the Safety Act has been termed "mandatory," its success depends
greatly on the industry's voluntary cooperation. Unwarranted ob-
jections or requests for consideration of standards could greatly
delay the process. Similarly, any petition for review by the federal
court of appeals may considerably delay the effective date of any
standard.
One problem is that the present standards affect only new
vehicles, some 9,800,000 each year. Since a vehicle has an expected
life of 100,000 miles and ten years, for many years a new car owner,
buying each year a less accident-prone car and a car safer in case
of an accident, will still be facing accidents inflicted by other ve-
hicles which not only lack safety features but are totally unsafe.
Hopefully, legislation will be passed under the grant-in-aid provi-
sions of the Highway Safety Act of 1966 to at least require inspec-
tion and maintenance of vehicles. 51
V. EFFETrvENESS OF THE ACT IN TEnRs OF ENFORCEMENT
A. Dealers' and Distributors' Rights
Assuming that appropriate standards are established each year,
there still remains the question of enforcement. As previously out-
lined, the Secretary has various means, such as penalties, injunctions
and contempt actions, to enforce compliance with the Act.152 But,
inasmuch as the purpose of the Act is to benefit the general public,
is there any enforcement possible by ultimate consumers? While
there may be indirect individual participation1 5 and relief, 54 the
See Main, A Slow Getaway for the Auto Market, FORTUNE, June 1, 1967, 111,
164.
See note 128 supra.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1398, 1399(a) and (b) (1964).
' E.g., an individual motor vehdle owner might qualify as a "person adversely
affected" and be allowed to petition for review of the Secretary's orders regarding stand-
ards. Reade v. Ewing, 205 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1953) held regarding a similar section
under the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act that an oleomargarine consumeres allegation
that the administrator's order violated the statute disclosed a "case of actual controversy"
and that the asserted consumer interest constituted the consumer a person "adversely
affected" to allow him to seek judidal review of the order. Also, there may be some
procedure established whereby a motor vehicle or equipment owner may register a
complaint against a noncomplying party with the Safety Bureau.
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Act directly provides for relief and private action only for one type
of parties, namely, dealers or distributors of motor vehicles or
motor vehicle equipment. 1 5 If a motor vehicle or equipment fails
to meet the required standards or contains a defect relating to motor
vehicle safety, the seller (manufacturer or distributor) prior to the
sale of the vehicle or equipment by the purchaser (distributor or
dealer), must either repurchase the vehicle or equipment or prompt-
ly deliver corrective parts to the purchaser and reimburse him for
installation.' 56 If the seller refuses to comply, the purchaser may
bring suit in any district court of the United States in the district
in which the seller resides or is found or has an agent, without
respect to the amount in controversy and recover his damages plus
all court costs and reasonable attorney fees. 157 Apparently, the
object of this provision was to place the financial responsibility for
noncompliance upon the one who fails to conform with the stand-
ards rather than upon the distributor or dealer who purchases the
vehicle or equipment in reliance on a certificate of compliance.
However, this section ignores the fact that motor vehicle parts and
equipment are assembled at various stages and are not always sold
by manufacturers or distributors and by distributors to manu-
facturers, but may involve sales among distributors or manufacturers.
Moreover, in some cases a distributor may be held liable for his
seller-manufacturer's noncompliance.
Some of the discrepancies can best be demonstrated by hypo-
thetical situations: (1) Assuming that manufacturer A sells a ve-
hicle to dealer D and that noncompliance is discovered before D
has sold the vehicle, A must either repurchase the vehicle or furnish
parts and reimburse installation costs; if A fails to do so under the
Act he may be sued in the district court and found liable for D's
damages as well as court costs and attorney fees. If D has sold the
Conceivably in an action brought on behalf of the government for penalty or
injunction, the court could grant relief to injured consumers. Originally it was believed
that equitable remedies in governmental litigation were not permitted unless authorized
by the statute in express terms. Thus restitution to drug purchasers in a case brought at
the instance of the Food and Drug Administration to restrain the introduction of cer-
tain misbranded drugs into interstate commerce was not allowed. See United States v.
Parkinson, 240 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1956). But Mitchel v. Robert DeMarlo Jewelry,
Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960), upheld the implied power of a court to order reimburse-
ment, even though the particular legislation only provided for an injunction.
15 U.S.C. § 1400 (1964).
'' Plus one percent of the purchase price prorated for each month from date of
notice to date of conformance. 15 U.S.C. § 1400 (a) (1964).
Id. § 1400(b) (1964).
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vehicle nothing is required of A. (2) Assuming A manufacturers
motor vehicle equipment1 58 which he sells to distributor X and
noncompliance is discovered before X has sold the equipment, again
A must either repurchase the equipment or furnish parts or be sued.
If X has sold the equipment to manufacturer Z, A has no further
obligation under the Act. Presumably Z is a major manufacturer
who is capable of exercising sufficient economic pressure to protect
himself.159 But what if A is a major manufacturer producing many
types of equipment and Z is a small company? Or what if X is a
large distributor and Z is a small outfit? Somehow, the economic
reasons for protecting X and not Z are no longer applicable. (3)
Assume that A has sold noncomplying equipment to X, which X has
sold to Y, another distributor, and that noncompliance is discovered
before Y has sold the equipment. X apparently is liable to Y because
Y as a distributor is entitled to the protection of the law. X is not
exempted because noncompliance was caused by A. Since X is only
a distributor, he cannot furnish parts. Thus apparently he must
repurchase the equipment and then proceed against A outside the
Act for his damages. Neither X nor Y can proceed directly against
A under the Act because of the intervening sale. 60 (4) Assuming
that A sells noncomplying equipment either (a) directly to Z or
(b) to X who in turn sells it to Z and that the noncompliance is
discovered prior to Z's sale of the equipment, Z has no remedies
under the Act because he is a manufacturer, not a distributor.
Only dealers and distributors who sell to the general public
and acquire the vehicle or equipment directly from the manu-
facturer are clearly protected. This situation implies that the
provision was written for the usual automobile dealer who acquires
the vehicles and most of the equipment and parts directly from
the automobile manufacturer. 18 Yet other parties may be equally
worthy of protection. If the Act intended to place the financial
responsibility on the nonconforming manufacturer, this could have
" Motor vehicle equipment is defined as any system, part, or component of a motor
vehicle. Id. § 1391(4) (1964).
Query: Is that a justifiable reason for denying someone a legal remedy?
1W Note that 15 U.S.C. § 1400 (a) (1964) simply states "prior to the sale of such
vehicle or item of equipment." Where a sale to the general public is intended, this is
specifically stated, such as in 15 U.S.C. § 1397(b) (1) (1964) which establishes that
prohibitions of that section "shall not apply to the sale. . . after the first purchase of
it in good faith for purposes other than resale."
In the past the automobile dealer has been found to be in an unequal bargain.
ing position with his manufacturer, and spedal legislation was passed to protect him, eg.,
"Automobile Dealers Day in Court," 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (1964).
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been achieved more easily by a statement that any person who
purchases a nonconforming motor vehicle or equipment prior to its
sale to the public may proceed directly against the noncomplying
manufacturer, unless the latter repurchases or furnishes parts and
pays for installation. Many states have recognized that lack of privity
of contract is not essential in certain situations in their sales law.16 2
Products liability cases have allowed direct suits against the manu-
facturers of defective products.103 Certainly, federal legislation can
strive for similar results.
B. Consumers' Rights
Since most of the motor vehicle or equipment purchasers are
ordinary consumers, who are neither motor vehicle or equipment
dealers nor distributors, no remedies are available to them under
the Safety Act. But the Act states that compliance with any federal
motor vehicle safety standard issued thereunder does not exempt
any person from any liability under common law.' 0 4 Thus, con-
versely, the consumer must look to common law for enforcement
of his rights also in case of noncompliance. Normally these would
be contract or tort actions.
1. Remedies Based on Sales Law
The consumer probably has two major safety-related interests
growing out of the Act, both arising with the purchase of the
vehicle or equipment. The first concerns the motor vehicle stand-
ards, which according to the Act should be present. The second
concerns safety-related defects. What can the consumer do when
his new purchase lacks some standard or reveals a defect? Since
this is a sales transaction, it is logical to turn to sales law to try
to find remedies for the consumer.
"2 The UNIFORm COMMERCIAL CODE, [hereinafter referred to as U.C.C.] adopted
by most states, in § 2-318 specifically states that a seller's warranty extends to any
natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer and is injured in person
by breach of the warranty.
"' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) which promotes what
is known as "strict liability" specifically states that one who sells any product in a
defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property
is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer
See Henningsen. v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), which
first definitely established that the ultimate consumer could proceed against the manu-
facturer directly. See also Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d
897 (1963); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal.2d 256, 391 P.2d 168 (1964).
'" 15 U.S.C. § 1397 (c) (1964).
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The history of sales law shows that sellers' responsibility for
quality began with formal collateral promises of warranty. Over the
years the formalities have become more and more relaxed, until
finally sales law is according protection against any hidden material
defects unless the parties have agreed otherwise.165 Most states
have adopted, with minor variations, the Uniform Commercial Code,
which provides that if goods fail in any respect to conform to the
contract upon delivery, the buyer may reject the whole, unless
otherwise agreed.166 Goods are defined as "conforming" when they
are in accordance with the obligations under the contract.16' The
Code specifically states that, unless excluded or modified, a war-
ranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract
for their sale, if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that
kind.16 Since a merchant is defined as a "person who deals in goods
of the kind,"'169 this would embrace an automobile dealer who then
becomes bound by any implied warranty of merchantability. Among
the examples of merchantability mentioned in the Code, at least two
fit a situation involving the sale and purchase of a motor vehicle:
(1) the goods must be fit for the ordinary purposes for which they
are used; and (2) they must conform to the promises or affirmations
of fact made on the container or label.'70 It cannot be denied that
a vehicle should be fit for driving and that it should conform to
any certification required under the Act to indicate compliance
with appropriate safety standards affixed to it.
In addition, the Code recognizes the creation of express war-
ranties when the seller makes any affirmation of fact or when
there is any description of the goods which become part of the
' See Kessler, The Protection of the Consumer Under Modern Sales Law, 74
YALE LJ. 262, 236 (1964).
2W U.C.C. § 2-601 (a).
Id. § 2-106(2).
Id. § 2-314(1).
I' d. §2-104 (1).
Id. § 2-314(2) (c) and (f). This affords increased consumer protection by re-
jecting the "adoption nile," which shielded a retainer from liability for having sold a
product not measuring up to the manufacturers claims printed on the package unless
the dealer, by conduct other than simply stocking the merchandise, had "adopted" such
claims as his own representation. See Comment, The Contractual Aspect of Consumer
Protection: Recent Developments in the Law of Sales Warranties, 64 MacL L REV.
1430, 1438 (1966).
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basis of the bargain; 71 it is not necessary to use formal words
or have a specific intention to make a warranty.172 Thus it can be
argued that a manufacturer's certification affixed to a car, as
required by the Act, 73 is an express warranty that the goods shall
conform to the statement. It can be further argued that "description
of goods" in case of a new model motor vehicle or equipment in-
cludes any requirements imposed on the manufacturer by law,17 4
such as compliance with any established federal safety standards.
While technically the manufacturer is not a seller to the purchaser
of the vehicle, 7 5 and the Act requires the certification to be made
to the dealer, 76 without such certification the dealer may be un-
willing to sell the vehicle.' 7 7 Thus such certification is necessarily
made to induce the purchaser to buy, and the manufacturer should
not be allowed to escape liability for breach of such "warranty"
" U.C.C. § 2-313(1):
Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affrmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which
relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an
express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the books which is made part of the basis of the bar-
gain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description.
While Comment 1 to § 2-313 indicates that express warranties rest on "dickered as-
pects of the individual bargain," Comment 2 recognizes that the warranty sections are
not designed to disturb those lines of case law growth which have recognized that war-
ranties need not be confined either to sales contracts or to the direct parties to such a
contract. See also Comment, The Contractual Aspect of Consumer Protecion.- Recent
Development in the Law of Sales Warranties, 64 MIca. L. REv. 1430, 1435 (1966).
U.C.C. § 2-313 (2).
172 15 U.S.C. § 1403 (1964).
174 A warranty is essentially a representation regarding the quality of particular
merchandise. It becomes part of a sales agreement either because of the parties' agree.
ment or because the law reads it into their contract. See Dunn v. Texas Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 84 S.W.2d 545, 549 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
7 U.C.C. § 2-103(1) (d) "Seller" means a person who sells or contracts to sell
goods.
1 15 U.S.C. § 1403 (1964):
Every manufacturer or distributor of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equip-
ment shall furnish to the distributor or dealer . ..the certification that each
such vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment conforms to all applicable
Federal motor vehicle safety standards ....
. A dealer would probably insist on a certification for his own protection, be-
cause if he sold a nonconforming vehicle he would be subject to penalty unless he
could establish that he did not have reason to know of the nonconformance or "holds
a certificate issued by the manufacturer ... to the effect that such vehicle . . . conforms
to all applicable Federal mootr vehicle safety standards . . " 15 U.S.C. § 1397(b) (2)
and (a) (1) (1964).
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merely because ,of lack of privity of contract or because the war-
ranty was not made directly to the purchaser.' 7 8 The Code itself is
silent regarding "vertical" privity, i.e., privity between manufacturer
and consumer, and the present case law is not conclusive. 79
At first glance it would seem that the consumer can proceed
against the dealer (or possibly also the manufacturer) for breach
of implied warranty in case of some safety-related defect and for
breach of express warranty against the manufacturer. Unfortunately,
the consumer's case is more complicated. Today a buyer in the
course of the purchase of a motor vehicle or equipment usually
recieves a warranty, which in effect limits his remedies under sales
law. Thus, for example, an automobile warranty guarantees the
vehicle and equipment to be free from defects in material and
workmanship under normal use and service. But it generaIlly states
that replacement or repair of certain specified parts is expressly
warranted in lieu of any other express or implied warranties,
including any implied warranty of merchantability, and of any
other obligation on the part of the manufacturer or the selling
dealer. This raises the question whether by such written warranty
other express warranties can be disclaimed, such as those repre-
sented by a certification in the form of a permanent tag affixed to
the vehicle. The Code provides that an implied warranty of mer-
chantability can be excluded by mentioning merchantability and
being conspicuous if the disclaimer is written. 8 0 Thus if the written
disclaimer complies with this rule the implied warranty can be
excluded. As to an express warranty, the Code indicates that an
. In the past, courts have invoked a number of fictions in order to avoid the harsh
effect of the traditional application of the rule of privity of contract. Some courts have
held manufacturers liable on an express warranty theory on the basis of representations
found in his consumer-oriented advertisements or product labels. See, e.g., Inglis v.
American Motors Corp., 3 Ohio St.2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965) (express war-
ranty found in manufacturers' representations in national advertising). Other courts
have allowed a plaintiff to sue the manufacturer of a defective product on the theory
that the retailer was the manufacturer's agent. See General Motors Corp. v. Dodson, 47
Tenn. App. 438, 338 S.W.2d 655 (1960).
" The U.C.C. does not specifically permit a direct action by the consumer against
the manufacturer but recognizes that developing case law may enlarge sellers' warranties.
See U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 2; U.C.C. § 2-318, Comment 3. But cf. Miller v. Preitz,
422 Pa. 383, 221 A.2d 320 (1966) (requirement of privity of contract applies to
actions in assumpsit for breach of implied warranty under the U.C.C.); Berry v. Ameri-
can Cyanamid Co, 341 F.2d 14, 15, n.1 (6th Cit. 1965) (though case was brought
under the Uniform Sales Act, the court, interpreting Texas law, indicated privity between
plaintiff and manufacturer would also be required under U.C.C.).
U.C.C. § 2-316 (2).
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inconsistent disclaimer will be ineffective.M'8 In the present case,
where there is an express warranty in the form of a certification
and a separate disclaimer an inconsistent disclaimer will be ineffec-
tive.""' In the present case where there is an express warranty
in the form of certification and a separate disclaimer, an incon-
sistency is present; the express warranty should prevail.
One example of past limitation of liability through the use
of automobile manufacturer's warranties has been the exclusion of
tires, which have been separately warrantied by tire manufact-
urers. 18 2 Under the Safety Act's definition of motor vehicle equip-
ment, tires appear to be included. 88 The certification section re-
quires that every manufacturer of motor vehicles or equipment
furnish the certification. In case of an item of motor vehicle equip-
ment, such certification may be in the form of a label or tag on
such item or on the outside of a container, or in the form of a
permanently affixed label or tag in the case of a vehicle. 184 No
exemption is made in the case of a vehicle manufacturer for
equipment already certified by some other manufacturer. Thus the
law apparently should be read as requiring the vehicle manufacturer
to include tire standards as part of his certification where the vehicle
is supplied with tires as part of the original equipment, even though
tire manufacturers are to provide for additional labelling. Reference
to tire purchasers in a section dealing with tire load standards may
indicate recognition that manufacturer's responsibility ends when
the purchaser picks his own tires.' Inasmuch as many vehicles
come fully assembled, including tires, it does not seem too harsh
to require the vehicle manufacturer to be liable for the entire
U.C.C. § 2-316(1):
Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and words
or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed wherever
reasonable as consistent with each other; but . . . negation or limitation is
inoperative to the extent that such construction is unreasonable.
A certification creating an express warranty and a written warranty excludlng other
warranties are inconsistent with each other. It cannot be claimed that a negation is reason-
able where it would operate to exclude some legal requirement.
' See N. Y. Times, April 2, 1967, § 14A, at A13.
"2 See 15 U.S.C. § 1391(4) (1964) "'Motor vehicle equipment' means any system,
part, or component of a motor vehicle .
15 U.S.C. § 1403 (1964).
15 U.S.C. § 1422 (1964).
The Secretary shall require that each motor vehicle be equipped by the manu-
facturer or by purchaser thereof at the time of the first purchase thereof In good
faith for purposes other than resale with tires which meet the maximum per-
missible load standards ....
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vehicle in such a case. He would be able to recoup his losses from
the noncomplying equipment manufacturer better than the con-
sumer who relied on the vehicle manufacturer to supply him with a
vehicle conforming to all established federal motor vehicle and
equipment safety standards.
A more difficult case is presented by a safety-related defect.
The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act provides only
that the purchaser must receive notification from the manufacturer
regarding any safety-related defect along with an evaluation of the
risk and information concerning repairs.180 As it relates to the
consumer, the Act is silent about who is responsible for correcting
the defect; it says nothing about the manufacturer's duty to recall
the vehicle or equipment or to furnish parts and pay for installation.
No express warranty regarding defects can be read into the Act
in favor of the consumer. At best, the consumer may hope that the
defect applies to a part of the vehicle covered by the manufacturer's
warranty. Since today's warranties are broader than ever before,
it may be that the defect affects a part of the vehicle which the
warranty promises to repair or replace. If not, then the consumer
must either rely on the manufacturer's willingness to go beyond
the express warranties or pay for the repair or replacement himself
and try to find a court willing to give him recovery on the basis
of implied warranty of merchantability, regardless of the disclaimer.
In the past some courts have held such disclaimers to be against
public policy.'87 Alternatively, under the Code it is possible to
argue that such a disclaimer is unconscionable. 188 Some of the
cases not recognizing disclaimers have involved extensive property
15 U.S.C. § 1402(a) (1964).
See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960).
-* U.C.C § 2-302 (1)
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract
to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to
enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without
the unconscionable clause ....
Some would find unconsdonability in situations involving (1) unfair surprise
where there is no actual assent to terms of a contract, similar to contracts of adhesion,
disclaimers of warranty provisions in manufacturers standard form contracts, or (2)
oppression, where, although there has been actual assent, the agreement, surrounding
facts, and relative bargaining position of the parties indicate the possibility of gross
over-reaching on the part of either party. See Note, The Docirine of Unconscionability,
19 MANE L. REV. 81, 82-3 (1967).
1968]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
damage or personal injuries.18 9 It is debatable how willing a court
would be to disregard a disclaimer in a case involving a minor
repair. Other courts have ruled that disclaimers should be recog-
nized.190 Possibly the manufacturers will voluntarily extend their
warranties to cover all federal safety standards and safety-related
defects.191 Until they do so, the consumer's position remains un-
clear, and different courts may render different decisions involving
the same type of standards and defects.
Another limitation often imposed by warranties concerns the
available relief. Thus, for example, most new automobile warran-
ties limit the purchaser's remedies to repair and replacement of
defective parts. The Code specifically permits such contractual limi-
tation of remedy, unless such remedy fails its essential purpose.19 2
If the newly purchased vehicle contains a safety-related defect which
can be easily repaired, obviously the remedy is sufficient. A different
situation arises when a vehicle simply fails to conform to some
federal standard which must be built in the vehicle. Obviously no
part can be replaced or repaired. Arguably, the essential purpose
of the contract remedy has failed. But there are many unsolved
questions, such as what should be the proper remedy; what is the
dollar value of a safety feature, the effectiveness of which might
be felt only upon impact in an accident; how much i the proper
," See supra note 163. But note that these cases did not involve the U.C.C.
"o See, e.g., Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Douglas Aircraft, 238 Cal. App.2d 95, 47
Cal. Rptr. 518 (1965), where waiver of all conditions or liabilities by seller was held
valid when case involved no element of personal injury, privity of contract issue, or
elements of inequality of bargaining, or adhesive contract. There was no thwarting of
public policy through recognition of disclaimers in the commercial world where the
buyer may be as able to absorb and administer the inevitable risks of the seller's operations.
. ' But note that recently the automobile warranties became more limited when
Chrysler announced that with itst 1968 models, its five-year or 50,000 mile warranty
would apply only to the first registered owner. General Motors and Ford made similar
warranties applicable to first and second owners only, the second being required to pay
a $25 transfer fee. Columbus Dispatch, Oct. 2, 1967, at 18A, col. 6. Note also that
industry practices differ. Automobile manufacturers have often recalled many cars vol.
untarily to correct possible defects. For example, early in 1967 Ford recalled 217,000
automobiles for brake malfunction checks and 85,000 Cougars for headlamp check,
Wall Street Journal. Feb. 23, 1967, at 37, col. 2 and May 23, 1967, at 12, col. 3.
General Motors recalled 12,600 Corvairs to put in new steering shifts and 26,000
Pontiacs for a brake check. Wall Street Journal, March 30, 1967, at 20, col. 1 and Feb.
13, 1967, at 5, col. 2. In the tire industry, some manufacturers have recalled tires for
defects (e.g., Goodyear and Dunlop), while others claim that they have had no reason




placement of a gasoline tank worth before an accident has occurred
and the car is surrounded by flames, etc. Possibly the only proper
remedy would be cancellation of the sale and refund of the price
paid,193 but again it may be questioned whether a court would
allow this in the presence of a limiting clause if the safety feature
appears "minor."'194 The Code does provide that limitation of
consequential damages must not be unconscionable and that limi-
tation of consequential damages for injury to the person
in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable.1 95
Conceivably, some court may extend "injury to the person" to
include injury to his property. In essence, then, remedies may be
limited for the consumer's smaller losses, involving design and
manufacturing defaults, but are more freely provided for larger
losses, such as personal injuries.196
2. Remedies Based on Strict Liability Theory
Some of the problems encountered in sales law, such as privity
of contract between the manufacturer and the purchaser, disclaimer
of warranties and limitation of remedies, disappear where the
action is based on strict liability in tort. 97 Such an action does not
' The buyer's need for an opportunity to reject goods appears strongest when
goods have been purchased for use rather than resale; the extent which a defect in
quality impairs the value may be difficult to establish. See Honnold, Buyers' Rig&t of
Reection, 97 U. PA. L. REv. 457, 469 (1949).
Under U.C.C. § 2-711(1), "Where . . . the buyer rightfully rejects or justi-
fiably revokes acceptance ... the buyer may cancel" When may he reject or revoke
acceptance? Unless otherwise agreed (thus again a disclaimer of warranty or limitation
of remedies would first have to be found nonapplicable), the buyer may reject if the
goods fail in any respect to conform to the contract, U.C.C. § 2-601. But the buyer
must state a particular defect which is ascertainable by reasonable inspection where the
seller could have cured, U.C.C. § 2-605, and the seller may notify of intention to cure,
U.C.C. § 2-508. It has been held that where a seller is willing to repair the item, the
purchaser has no right of rescission. See Wilson v. Scampoli, 228 A.2d 848 (C.A.D.C.
1967). Presumably a defective vehicle design cannot be cured. If the buyer has ac-
cepted the vehicle rejection is precluded. If he knew of the nonconformity he cannot
revoke acceptance unless the latter was on the reasonable assumption that the non-
conformity would be seasonably cured, U.C.C. § 2-607(2), or if the nonconformity
substantially impairs the value to him, U.C.C. § 2-608(1). Query: will absence of
any safety standard or presence of any safety-related defect, as established with reference
to the Safety Act, be considered as substantially impairing the value?
2" U.C.C. § 2-719 (3).
'" See Klein v. Asgrow Seed Co., 246 A.C.A. 102, 54 Cal. Rptr. 609, 618, 619,
n. 8 (Dist. Ct. of App. 1966), which presents an interesting handling of a limitation
of liability clause.
' See Greeno v. Clark Equipment Co., 237 F. Supp. 427, 429 (N.D. ld. 1965).
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depend on any warranty under a contract of sale. Instead, it is
based on the manufacturer's liability for placing a defective article
on the market, imposed on him by law. Any provisions in the con-
tract of sale regarding the product generally become immaterial. 10 8
While the textbook definition of the tort requires the product at
the time of its sale to be in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property,190 in many
instances courts have broadened the application of the tort action
to include instances where the defective product could be considered
dangerous only by using hindsight after the defect has caused some
personal injury or property damage.200 At the same time, though,
the manufacturer is not an insurer for all injuries caused by his
product but only for those attributable to a defect in the product at
the time of the sale by him.201 Thus one of the first questions for a
court to determine is whether a defect has been alleged. 20 2 While
"defects" as found in the individual cases cover a wide range, it
has been suggested that the nature and scope of a defect may be
delineated by reference to six categories: (1) the product must be
one that is unreasonably dangerous; (2) it involves unexpected
danger; (3) it bears inadequate warning concerning dangers from
proper use; (4) it has a defect which is not natural to the product;
(5) it produces a reaction which is not an isolated occurrence; or
(6) the product creates an ultra-hazardous condition.20 8 While a
safety-related defect in a motor vehicle or equipment would fit
most of these categories, it may be questioned whether a court
would say the same regarding the absence of some safety standard,
such as one dealing with passenger impact after an accident, if no
'" See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) Or TORTS § 402A, Comment m at 355 (1965).
Accord, Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 897, (1964).
' See Kessler, Products Liability, 76 YALE L. J. 887, 906 (1967). See also R11.
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment i, at 352 (1965).
' See, e.g., Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D Hawaii 1961), afld, 304
F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962) (hula skirt); Hoskins v. Jackson Grain Co,, 63 So.2d 514
(Fla. 1953) (dictum) (seeds).
" See Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability,
32 TENN. L. REv. 363, 366-67 (1965).
... See lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.B,2d 185
(1966), which lists certain elements which plaintiff must prove to the jury's satisfaction
to recover for personal injuries: (1) the product was defective; (2) it was defective
at the time of the sale by the manufacturer; (3) the defect directly and proximately
caused the plaintiff's injury; and (4) the plaintiff's presence could reasonably be antlcl-
pated.
Freedman, "Defect" in the Product: The Necessary Basis for Products Liability
in Tort and in Warranty, 33 TENN. L. REV. 323 (1966).
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accident has yet occurred. If an accident occurs and if it can be
proved that but for the absence of a feature complying with a
safety standard injuries would be nonexistent, hindsight may find
the default "unreasonably dangerous. '204
Most strict liability cases have involved personal injuries 05
and property damage.2 06 But some cases have extended the action to
cover "economic loss,"207 namely, the difference between what the
product would have been worth without the defect and the product
as obtained. 20 8 Others maintain that warranty theory was not suited
to the field of liability for personal injuries and, therefore, it was
abandoned in favor of strict liability in tort. Since the rules govern-
ing warranties are appropriate in commercial transactions, a strict
Today the major barrier to recovery may lie not in finding law to support the
doctrine but rather in ferreting out the existing evidence in order to make use of the
law. There must be an investigation of the situs of the accident and a gathering of
external evidence to show the creation of an unreasonable risk by the manufactuer
through faulty product design (or manufacture). Yet too often the damaged vehicle is
not available for identification of the injurious design and the pattern of injury to the
plaintiff because it has been towed away to the junk yard or to the repair shop. Often
counsel has not accumulated sufficient scientific engineering knowledge. See Nader,
Automobile Design: Evidence Catching Up With the Law, 42 DENvER LC.J. 32, 33
(1965). Also, what might have been sufficient evidence in the early cases when strict
liability was first established, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358,
161 Al2d 69 (1960) (physically impossible to determine whether any part of the
steering wheel mechanism had been defective, and no effort to negate other causes),
may not be sufficient today, e.g., Jakubowski v. Minneapolis Mining & Mfg. Co., 42
N.J. 177, 199 A.2d 826 (1964) (proof of defect cannot be demonstrated simply by
evidence of careful conduct of the plaintiff or other third party handling or using the
product). See note 203 supra at 325.
Supra note 189.
See, e.g., Lang v. General Motors Corp., 136 N.W.2d 805 (N. Dakota 1965);
Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873
(1958).
See, e.g., Randy Knitware, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181
N..2d 399 (1962); Santor v. A. & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305
(1965).
' See Note, anufactaurers' Liability to Remote Purchasers for "Economic Loss"
Damages-Tort or Contract?, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 539, 541 (1966).
See Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal.2d 915-19, 403 P.2d 145, 149-51 (1965).
The main reason for strict liability is said to be "risk spreading." See Prosser, Asault
Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 Yale LJ. 1099, 1120 (1960).
This argument maintains that those who suffer injury from defective products are un-
prepared to meet the consequences, whereas the risk of injury can be insured by the
manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business. See Escola
v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 CaL2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (concurring
opinion). But see generalty Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the
Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961).
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liability action should not be available for economic loss. 200 Another
possibility, however, is to allow strict liability in cases involving
consumers, because they are not in an equal bargaining positon
with the manufacturer. The consumer is unable to protect himself
from insidious contractual provisions, such as disclaimers, foisted
upon him by commercial enterprises and is seldom steeped in the
business practice which justify the notice requirements. 2 10
Thus there are essentially three reasons why the theory of
strict liability, though more liberal in some respects than sales
law, may fail to provide a remedy where a purchaser of a motor
vehicle or equipment attempts to bring an action for noncompliance
with federal safety standards or presence of safety-related defects.
First, all jurisdictions have not accepted the doctrine of strict lia,
bility in tort against the manufacturer for damages arising out of a
defective product.211 Second, some jurisdictions still require that a
defective product be inherently dangerous, at least in light of hind.
sight; it may be difficult to prove prior to an accident that the lack
of a safety standard is inherently dangerous, unless the courts hold
that because Congress has determined the necessity of such stand-
ards for the safety of the public their absence makes the vehicle or
equipment inherently dangerous. Third, some jurisdictions may not
allow a strict liability action for economic loss.
3. Remedies Based on Doctrine of Misrepresentation
The consumer may also attempt to enforce his interests arising
out of the Safety Act by claiming misrepresentation. While mis-
representation often appears in the law of torts as a method of
accomplishing various types of tortious conduct,212 as a separate
tort it has been identified with the action for damages for deceit.
Deceit was originally closely allied to the action for breach of
warranty but later became disassociated and today exists independ-
ent of any contractual relations, though it usually involves a busi-
ness transaction between two or more parties. What the law pro-
tects is the interest in formulating business judgments without
being misled by others. Conduct leading to liability for deceit
" See Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal.2d 9, 27, 403 P.2d 145, 158 (1965)
(dissenting opinion).
See generally Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liablity to the Conmuer),
50 MIN . L. REv. 791 (1966).
' Liability in damages for misrepresentation may be based upon intent to de-
ceive, upon negligence or upon a policy which requires defendant to be strictly liable
for his statement PROSSER, HA BOOK OF LAW OF TORTS 698 (1964).
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consists of: (1) false representation made by the defendant regarding
some fact; (2) scienter, i.e., knowledge or belief on the part of the
defendant that the representation is false, or insufficient information
on the defendant's part for him to make the statement; (3) inten-
tion to induce the plaintiff to act or to refrain from acting in re-
liance upon the representation; (4) justified reliance upon the repre-
sentation by the plaintiff; and (5) damage caused by such re-
liance.213 Thus if a vehicle carried the requisite certification under
the Safety Act but, in fact, some federal motor vehicle or equip-
ment safety standard had not been met, the consumer could argue
the manufacturer was liable for misrepresentation.
But the consumer may have trouble proving scienter and dam-
ages. The task of measuring the value of the various safety features
and the difference, for example, between the value of a specially
padded panel, which might prevent injury in case of an accident,
and the value of an ordinary panel as installed in a vehicle, may
prove overwhelming. Nominal damages have been held insufficient
for finding liability in a deceit action.2 14 One procedural alternative
may aid here. Out of common law procedure a doctrine developed
that where the commission of a tort results in the unjust enrich-
ment of the defendant at the plaintiff's expense, the plaintiff may
disregard or "waive" the tort action and instead sue on a theoretical
and fictitious contract for restitution of the benefits which the de-
fendant has so received. Restitution in quasi-contract looks to what
the defendant has received, which may be either more or less than
the plaintiff's actual loss.2 15 Once the plaintiff has tendered the
goods and rescinded the contract, he can ask for restitution based
on misrepresentation. 16 Some of the other requirements of the
action also become less strict. Restitution may be allowed even
though the misrepresentation is negligent 17 or innocent,215 the
= 1 HARPER & JAMEs, THE LAw OF TORTS 527-28 (1956).
"' See, e.g., Ansley v. Bank of Piedmont, 113 Ala. 467, 21 So. 59 (1896) (dam-
ages must be established with reasonable certainty and must not be speculative or con-
tingent); Alden v. Wright, 47 Minn. 225, 49 N.W. 767 (1891) (nominal damages
cannot be awarded).
PRossER, supra note 212 at 644 (1964).
See, e.g., E.T.C. Corp. v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 271 N.Y. 124, 2 NE2d
284 (1936) (refund of purchase price denied in an action at law because no tender
made prior to suit).
' E.g., Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 NE. 441 (1931) (ac-
countants held liable for negligent certification of balance sheet).
' See, e.g., Seneca Wire & Mfg. Co. v. A.B. Leach & Co., 247 N.Y. 1, 159 N.E.
700 (1928).
1968]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
plaintiff examined the goods,2 19 the plaintiff did not rely on the
statement alone,220 or the plaintiff suffered no pecuniary dam-
ages.221 Occasionally what might be properly considered an implied
warranty may be found sufficient.22 2 If the manufacturer was aware
of certain safety-related defects in an entire line of vehicles, the
consumer may claim there was a misleading nondisclosure. Since a
defendant may reasonably be taken to represent that some things
are true merely by entering into a transaction, 228 the consumer
could even argue that by selling a new vehicle the dealer or manu-
facturer represents it to be free of defects, since generally such war-
ranty accompanies a sale.
Before the consumer can recover, he must satisfy the court
that he is not attempting to be relieved of a bad bargain. This is
done through the requirement of materiality. In order for a mis-
representation to be material, the difference between the facts as
they are and the facts as they were represented to be must be of
such a character as likely to influence an ordinary person. If it is
the kind of misstatement to which no reasonable person would
attach any significance, then a claimant will not be afforded relief
simply because of his statement that he relied thereon.22 4 Thus it
is important to first determine what an ordinary person expects
when he purchases a new motor vehicle or equipment. Inasmuch as
purchasers in the past have never expected vehicles to be free of
defects and have not voluntarily elected to purchase all equipment
which might lead to safer driving, a court could easily find that
the purchaser received substantially what he bargained for and that
restitution is not proper. Some courts probably found a representa-
tion not of sufficient materiality after weighing the plaintiff's
comparatively small loss against the large amount involved in the
" See, e.g., Foote v. Wilson, 104 Kan. 191, 178 P. 430 (1919) (farmer examined
store and contents before purchase).
m' See e.g., Alder v. Yager, 215 Ky. 678, 286 S.W. 983 (1926) (inspection of
coal mine prior to exchange for a farm).
=' See, e.g., Edward Thompson Co. v. Schroeder, 131 Minn. 125, 154 N.W. 792
(1915) (lawyer bought law books relying on statement that same books were not sold
to others in same town).
= See, e.g., Smith v. Zimbalist, 2 Cal. App. 2d 324, 38 P.2d 170 (1934) (de
scription of violin in bill of sale amounted to an implied warranty of genuineness).
"' See, e.g., that a bank receiving deposits is solvent, Cassidy v. Uhlmann, 170
N.Y. 505, 63 N.E. 554 (1902); or that a stock certificate is valid, Pennebaker v.
Kimble, 126 Ore. 317, 269 P. 981 (1928).
" See Keeton, Actionable Misrepresentation: Legal Fault as a Requirement, 11




4. Consumers Should Have Remedies Under the Safety Act
The foregoing discussion of the problems facing the consumer
who seeks a remedy for the manufacturer's noncompliance with
the Safety Act makes it apparent that the consumer does not have
adequate relief available under state law. Yet Congress' failure to
extend to the consumer at least some of the rights granted under
the Act to dealers and distributors was not an oversight. -2 2 6 Pos-
sibly Congress was simply reluctant to extend federal jurisdiction
into an area dominated by state law. But federal courts are already
available in diversity cases involving claims in excess of 10,000
dollars,2 27 whether or not state courts can provide adequate relief.
Several things could have been achieved by providing specific
relief for the consumer under the Act. First, by stating that the
manufacturer or dealer must deliver to the consumer a vehicle or
equipment complying with appropriate federal safety standards
and free of safety-related defects or repurchase the vehicle or
equipment or repair or replace it free of cost to the purchaser, a
higher standard of duty toward the purchaser would have been
established, which standard could be used by courts in cases in-
volving conflicting warranties or disputes regarding repairs. Second,
by providing that in case of noncompliance by the manufacturer
or dealer the consumer may proceed with an action in the United
States district court, without reference to the amount involved, and
recover the amount of his loss plus court costs and reasonable at-
torney fees, Congress would have been assured (1) that worthwhile
claims are not denied litigation simply because of lack of money
for attorney fees, and (2) that out of any recovery there is suf-
ficient money left to actually provide for any necessary vehicle or
equipment repairs or replacement. This would foster the purpose
of the Safety Act by assuring that the consumer acquires a reason-
ably safe vehicle or equipment. There is no reason why the usual
tort actions, such as negligence or strict liability, would not be
See, e.g., L-a Bar v. Lindstrom, 158 Minn. 453, 197 N.W. 756 (1924) ($17,000
contract not rescinded where $275 could correct roof defect); but ci. Dubovy v. Woolf,
127 Mle. 269, 143 A. 58 (1928) ($7,500 contract for purchase of a house rescinded
because of $50 worth of defects).
A suggested amendment providing for corrective recalls was not included in the
bill. 112 CONG. REc. 18792 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1966). Also the point was made that
the act preserved all common law remedies existing against a manufacturer for the benefit
of a purchaser. See 112 CONG. REc. 18807 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1966).
= 28 U.S.C § 1332 (1964).
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tried in state courts as at present. Since in such cases the attorney
usually undertakes to represent the plaintiff on a contingent fee
basis, calling for one-third or one-half of the amount recovered,
any award of a "reasonable attorney fee," probably would only
cover a part of the fee and would not by itself induce suit in a
federal court.
C. Effect of Safety Act Upon Negligence Actions
Thus far nothing has been said concerning the effect of the
Safety Act on negligence actions, which have as their purpose the
restoration of the injured person after an accident has hap-
pened.22 8 Emphasis has been on how to prevent such actions, be-
cause obviously if a defectively designed or manufactured vehicle
can be returned to the manufacturer or repaired a possible acci-
dent can be averted and a negligence action against the manu-
facturer avoided. Courts have treated the presence of a safety act
in different ways. Violation of such a statute has been held to be
negligence per se229 or as establishing a standard which may or
may not be accepted in a particular case. 280 There is good argu-
ment for finding some violation of the Safety Act, e.g., noncompli-
ance with federal safety standards, as neglgigence per se because
the purpose of the Act is to protect the public against unreason-
able risk of accidents occurring as a result of design, construction
or performance of motor vehicles or equipment and against un-
s See O'Connell, Taming the Automobile, 58 Nw. UIL. REV. 299, 312 (1963).
E.g., Bolitho v. Safeway Stores, 109 Mont. 213, 95 P.2d 443 (1939) (pure
food acts construed to make the sale of defective goods for consumption negligence per
se); Schell v. DuBoir, 94 Ohio St. 93, 113 N.E. 664 (1916) (violation of a traffic
ordinance held negligence per se); Turner v. Wilson, 227 S.C. 95, 86 S.B.2d 867 (1955),
30 See, e.g., Phoenix Refining Co. v. Powell, 251 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. 1952) (penal
provision prescribing an appropriate standard for measuring civil liability need not be
given effect as fixing civil liability; party violating the statute may raise an issue as to
an excusable violation); Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School District, 29 Cal. 2d 581,
177 P.2d 279 (1947) (violation of a traffic ordinance raised a rebuttable presumption
of negligence. Concurring opinion argued that if the statutory standard is applicable
at all, the conduct of the parties must be measured by that standard and jury is not
free to determine what a reasonably prudent man would have done under the circum-
stances). James, Statutory Standards and Negligence in Accident Cases, 11 LA. L. Ruv,
95, 106-14 (1950), discusses whether a violation of a statute should be held negligence
per se in a civil action. He criticizes the widely accepted rationalization that a civil ac-
tion cannot be regarded as one upon the statute where the statute gives no civil remedy
but that any recovery for breach of the statute must be worked out on common law
principles of negligence, which involve the standard of reasonably prudent conduct
which is usually for the jury to decide upon.
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reasonable risk of death or injury to persons in the event accidents
occur. Certainly any owner, driver, occupant of a vehicle, or even
a pedestrian coming in contact with a vehicle, belongs to the class
of persons whose interests .were sought to be protected by the legis-
lation. In the case of an accident attributable to the manufacturer's
noncompliance with some federal motor vehicle or equipment saf-
ety standard, these persons have an interest invaded by the manu-
facturer's misconduct, which interest was of the type that the legis-
lature, sought to safeguard. It would be sufficient for the plaintiff
to show that the noncompliance was the proximate cause of the
injury, unless the court found the defendant's action was not the
proximate cause because of some third party's intervening act or
another intervening force.231
While a manufacturer's -liability to those foresecably endang-
ered by his negligently manufactured product has been long estab-
lished,23 2 courts have been more hesitant in holding the manufac-
turer liable for negligent design.283 This has been due to a re-
luctance to allow juries or lay persons to pass judgment on the work
of experts and to fear that finding negligent design will result in
many additional claims and require extensive remodeling of a prod-
uct or its removal from the market.23 4 The passage of the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 should indicate to
courts that the social policy of the country in regard to motor
' See Comment, Liability for Negligent Automobile Design, 1967 IowA L REv.
953, 966-68 for the requisite elements in establishing negligence per se. See also
Johnson, Effect of Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety as Applied to Tires, 34 INs.
COUoNSEL J. 261, 265 (1967), who speculates on whether the Safety Act may not be
interpreted in the same way as the Safety Appliance Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1201-203 (1964),
which has been held to impose absolute liability upon a railroad for any failure to main.
tain or equip its trains with that specified apparatus designated in the Act, without the
necessity of showing negligence or even knowledge of 'the violation or noncompliance.
See Clark v. Atlantic Coast Line R.1R, 244 F.2d 368, 373 (D.C.C. 1957) (obvious
purpose of the Safety Appliance Act is to induce carriers to adhere to higher standards
in their operations by imposing a liability on interstate carriers if they do not comply
with the act).
' See Macpherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
' An exception to this has been occasional cases involving breach of express war-
ranty where the equities strongly favored the injured plaintiff who had purchased an
automobile in reliance on a false assurance as to the qualities of the product. See Baxter
v. Ford Motor Co, 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932), aff'd after retrial, 179 Wash.
123, 35 P.2d 1090 (1934); Katz, Liability of Automobile Manufacturers for Unsafe
Design of Passenger Cars, 69 HARv. L. REv. 863 (1956).
=" See Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a Prod-
uact, 71 YALE LJ. 816 (1962).
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vehicle and equipment design is changing, with present emphasis
on safety.2 35 Inasmuch as the Act provides only for minimum stand-
ards, 236 there is no reason why a court should not impose a greater
duty on the manufacturer for improving the design and perform-
ance of his vehicle or equipment where he is aware of a potential
safety problem and has the requisite engineering knowhow and
ability to correct it at a reasonable cost. It has been suggested that
where the original design is clearly defective the manufacturer
should have the duty to take any reasonable steps, including the
supplying of an easily attachable safety device to products already
sold.23 7 If this reasoning were applied to the instances involving
safety-related defects that are sufficiently important to call for
notification under the Safety Act, the manufacturer would be re-
quired to either provide means for repairing the defects or be re-
sponsible for resulting injuries.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act of 1966 required the creation of federal safety standards gov-
erning certain aspects of motor vehicles and motor vehicle equip-
ment. Since the standards are of a minimum nature, any major
safety improvements will probably be the result of voluntary ef-
forts by the automobile industry. In fact, the implementation of the
entire Act, from the setting and adopting of standards to provid-
ing a consumer with a reasonably safe vehicle or equipment in-
corporating all applicable safety standards, depends greatly on the
voluntary cooperation of the automotive industry. The industry's
future actions are especially important in the consumer area. As
previously discussed, the consumer's remedies are quite inadequate.
Yet by voluntarily designing and manufacturing safer and better
vehicles and equipment, providing for recalls and repairs when.
ever necessary, and liberalizing their warranty provisions, the manu-
facturers could make further legislation unnecessary.
Velta A. Melnbrencis
n Manufacturers' protection from tort liability for their defective products by prlvity
restrictions, notice requirements, defense of contributory negligence as well as reluctance
of many courts to submit design negligence cases to uries reflects a polcy of the law
which was necessary during the development of our free enterprise economy but the
need for which has passed. See Philo, Automobile Products Liability Litlgalion, 4 DvQ.
L. REv. 181, 182 (1966).
= 15 U.S.C. § 1381 (1964).
See Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Direclions for Usa of a
Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816, 818 (1962).
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